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OPSOMMING
Die ‘algemeen geldende regsvoorskrif’ vereiste in onteieningsreg en die 
implikasies van die Onteieningswetsontwerp van 2015
In hierdie artikel word die vereiste ‘algemeen geldende regsvoorskrif’ in
artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika,1996,
ontleed aan die hand van die Onteieningswetsontwerp van 2015. Die
relevante bepalings van die wetsontwerp laat blyk dat onteiening slegs
geldig sal wees indien onteiening in wetgewing gematig word. Verder word
dit duidelk gestel dat die onteieningsprosedure soos uiteengesit in die
wetsontwerp gevolg moet word in alle gevalle waar eiendom onteien word,
ongeag of die wetsontwerp of ander magtigende wet op gesteun word om
die eiendom te onteien. 
Die vereistes dat onteiening in wetgewing gemagtig moet word en dat die
onteieningsprosedure in die wetsontwerp gevolg moet word, laat vrae
onstaan oor die korrektheid van die toestaan van vergoeding vir ’n
onteiening in gevalle waar daar geen magtiging vir die onteiening in die
relevant wetgewing was nie, en waar daar ook geen formele
onteieningsprosedure gevolg was nie. 
Siende die toestaan van vergoeding vir onteiening in die toekoms slegs kan
geskied in gevalle waar daar magtiging vir onteiening is en waar die
onteieningprosedure gevolg was, blyk dit dat konstruktiewe onteiening nie
toepassing kan vind in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg nie. Dit word gestel dat
konstruktiewe onteiening slegs erken kan word in gevalle waar daar nie
streng klem geplaas word op ’n statutêre basis vir onteiening nie. Daarom,
indien die wetsontwerp in werking tree sal konstruktiewe onteiening nie
toepassing kan vind in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg nie.
‘[s]ince there is no common-law authority for expropriation in South African
law, the law of general application that is required for expropriation by section
25(2) must specifically and clearly authorise an expropriation of property.’1
1 Van der Walt ‘Property law in the constitutional democracy’ 2017 Stell LR
(forthcoming). 
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1 Introduction
Section 25(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
requires an expropriation to be effected in terms of law of general
application and undertaken for a public purpose or in the public interest.
An expropriation must also be compensated, and the standard for the
amount of compensation is that it must be just and equitable. While
substantial research has been conducted on various issues relating to the
public purpose or public interest requirement2 and the calculation of just
and equitable compensation,3 the law of general application requirement
has not received similar attention. Similarly, courts have considered
issues surrounding public purpose or public interest4 and matters
concerning compensation,5 but little, if any, attention has been paid to
the law of general application requirement.6 In his last article, André van
der Walt therefore correctly points out that the ‘law of general application
requirement’ has ‘arguably not received sufficient attention or rigorous
enough analysis in case law.’7 
2 See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (2011) 458-503; Du Plessis
‘Restitution of expropriated property upon non-realisation of the public
purpose’ 2011 TSAR 579-592; Van der Walt & Slade ‘Public purpose and
changing circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011
(1) SA 601 (KZP)’ 2012 SALJ 219-235; Slade The Justification of
Expropriation for Economic Development (LLD thesis 2012 US); Slade ‘The
less invasive means argument in expropriation law’ 2013 TSAR 199-216;
Slade ‘Public purpose or public interest’ and third party transfers’ 2014 PER
166-206; Slade ‘Addressing the issue in Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality in
legislation’ 2014 Stell LR 116-125; Mostert ‘The poverty of precedent on
public purpose/interest: An analysis of pre-constitutional an post-apartheid
jurisprudence in South Africa’ in Hoops et al (eds) Rethinking Expropriation
Law Vol I (2015) 59-92. 
3 Van der Walt (2011) 503-520; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and
Schoeman’s The Law of Property (2006) 568-578; Du Plessis Compensation
for Expropriation under the Constitution (LLD thesis 2008 US).
4 On the less invasive means argument, see Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v
Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11,
4 February 2010; Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works [2010]
ZAGPPHC 154, 12 October 2010; Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of
Public Works [2011] ZASCA 246, 1 December 2011. On the re-transfer of
expropriated property on the non-realisation of the public purpose, see
Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP). On the lawfulness of
third party transfers see, eThekwini Municipality v Sotirios Spetsiotis [2009]
ZAKZDHC 51, 6 November 2009; Bartsch Consult v Mayoral Committee of
the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality supra; Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and
Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2009 5 SA 661 (SE); 2010
4 SA 242 (SCA); 2011 1 SA 293 (CC); Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality supra.
5 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC); Haffejee v eThekwini
Municipality 2011 6 SA 134 (CC); Msiza v Director-General, Department of
Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 5 SA 513 (LCC). 
6 For instance, in Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality supra n 4 at 82, the court
referred to the two prerequisites for an expropriation in terms of the
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 as being public purpose and compensation,
whilst not having regard to the constitutional requirement that it must be
effected in terms of law of general application. 
7 Van der Walt 2017 Stell LR (forthcoming).
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The Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, which currently governs
expropriation law in South Africa, predates the Constitution by some 20
years. Therefore, it is not aligned with the constitutional provisions,
especially section 25(2)-(3) that sets out the constitutional requirements
for an expropriation. For instance, the Expropriation Act does not refer
to a ‘public interest’ requirement,8 and the calculation of compensation
is based primarily on the market value of the property.9 In terms of the
Constitution, market value is but one factor in calculating just and
equitable compensation.10 Attempts to repeal the 1975 Expropriation
Act have twice been unsuccessful. Both the 2008 Expropriation Bill11 and
the 2013 Expropriation Bill12 were retracted after receiving severe
criticism. The 1975 Expropriation Act is set to be repealed by the 2015
Expropriation Bill.13 The Expropriation Bill aims to ‘ensure consistency
with the Constitution and uniformity of procedure of all
expropriations’.14 The Bill, therefore, seeks to replace the primary
expropriation act with one that is aligned with the constitutional
requirements, in particular, section 25 (the property clause) and section
33(1), which provides for lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair
administrative action. 
Since the Expropriation Bill seeks alignment with the constitutional
provisions and aims to streamline the expropriation procedure, it differs
substantially from the current Expropriation Act. The Bill differs from the
8 In Offit Enterprises v Coega Development Corporation supra 674 the high
court held that the public interest requirement in the Constitution must be
read in to the Expropriation Act to ensure compliance of the Act with the
constitutional provisions. 
9 S 12 of the Act dictates that the compensation to be awarded for the
expropriation of property shall not exceed the market value plus an amount
‘to make good any actual financial loss caused by the expropriation’. In Du
Toit v Minister of Transport supra par 36 the Court indicated that ‘[i]t would
have been more expedient if the Legislature had made provision in the Act
itself for complying with the constitutional standards of just and equitable
compensation and ensuring that an equitable balance between the
interests of the State and those of the individual is reflected.’ 
10 In Msiza v Director-General supra the Land Claims Court held that although
market value is a starting point to determine just and equitable
compensation, it is not the most important factor; all the factors in s 25(3)
must be given appropriate consideration. On the compensation provisions
in the Expropriation Bill, see Van Wyk ‘Compensation for land reform
expropriation’ 2017 TSAR 21-35.
11 On the Expropriation Bill B16-2008 [explanatory summary of Bill published
in Government Gazette No 30963 of 11 April 2008] see Du Plessis ‘The
(shelved) Expropriation Bill B16-2008: An unconstitutional souvenir or an
alarmist memento?’ 2011 Stell LR 352-275; Pienaar ‘Die grondwetlikheid
van die voorgestelde onteieningsraamwerk vir Suid-Afrika’ 2009 TSAR 344-
352; Van der Walt ‘Constitutional property law’ 2008 ASSAL 231-240.
12 On the 2013 Expropriation Bill GN 234 in GG 36269 of 20-03-2013, see
Van der Walt ‘Constitutional property law’ 2013 ASSAL 216-220.
13 See https://pmg.org.za/bill/550/ (accessed 2017-04-04). The President
referred the Bill back to the National Assembly because of reservations
concerning inadequate public participation.
14 Memorandum on the Objects of the Expropriation Bill, 2015 par 1.3, http://
www.publicworks.gov.za/docswhitepapers.html (accessed 2017-04-04).
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Expropriation Act in the sense that it places greater emphasis on the
statutory authority to expropriate.15 The Bill explicitly states that
expropriation may only be effected if the use of the power of
expropriation is authorised by legislation.16 In this regard, the Bill gives
clearer guidance on the understanding of the law of general application
requirement in section 25(2) that has been somewhat neglected in the
literature and case law thus far. The Bill also requires an expropriation to
be undertaken for a public purpose or public interest. The definition of
public purpose in the Bill is similar to the definition currently in the
Expropriation Act.17 The public interest definition in the Expropriation
Bill is very similar to the definition of public interest in section 25(4) of
the Constitution,18 although it does emphasise that reforms are
necessary to bring about the equitable access to all South Africa’s natural
resources ‘in order to redress the results of past racially discriminatory
laws or practices’.19 The Bill also contains detailed provisions regarding
the calculation and payment of compensation in line with the
constitutional requirements in section 25(2) and (3).20 
This article will, however, focus specifically on the law of general
application requirement in section 25(2) of the Constitution and the
implementation of this requirement in the Expropriation Bill. The
purpose of this article is therefore to consider the authority to expropriate
in more detail, with reference to the new Expropriation Bill and
applicable case law. This article will also consider the implications the
new Bill will have for the recognition of the doctrine of constructive
expropriation in South African law.
2 The Law of General Application Requirement and the 
Expropriation Bill
Section 25(2) of the Constitution requires an expropriation to be effected
in terms of law of general application. The current Expropriation Act is
regarded as law of general application.21 Therefore, any expropriation
effected in terms of this Act would satisfy the law of general application
requirement in section 25(2) of the Constitution. However, the exact
meaning of ‘law of general application’ is not clear from the Act and
courts have not been able to give further guidance as to what would be
15 S 2(1) of the Expropriation Act authorises the minister of public works to
expropriate property in terms of the Act, but s 2(2) of the Act makes it clear
that the minister may expropriate property in terms of s(1) or ‘any other
law’. The Act does not further indicate what is meant by the term ‘law’. 
16 See clause 2(3) and the discussion below.
17 ‘[P]ublic purposes’ includes any purposes connected with the
administration of the provisions of any law by an organ of State’.
18 S 25(4)(a) of the Constitution states that ‘the public interest includes the
nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reform to bring about
equitable access to all South Africa’s national resources’. 
19 Clause 1 of the Expropriation Bill.
20 Ch 5 of the Expropriation Bill 
21 Offit Enterprises v Coega Development Corp supra (SE) 674.
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considered ‘law of general application’ in relation to expropriation
disputes. 
The ‘law of general application’ requirement has been considered, to
some extent, in the context of the limitation of rights in terms of section
36(1) (the limitation clause) of the Constitution. Section 36(1) states that
‘[t]he rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of
general application …’. In theory, section 36(1) would be applied if there
were a limitation of a right in the Bill of Rights. Therefore, if there has
been a limitation of the right in section 25(2), the case proceeds to
limitation analysis in terms of section 36(1).22 In relation to the law of
general application requirement in section 36(1), the literature indicates
that the limitation must be authorised by a law that was ‘properly
adopted’,23 and the law must be of general application.24 Usually, a
broad understanding of ‘law’ is accepted. The concept ‘law’ therefore
includes original and delegated legislation, the rules of common law and
customary law.25 
However, the understanding of the ‘law of general application’
requirement specifically in expropriation cases is vastly different from
the broader, more general understanding thereof in the broader
constitutional context.26 Van der Walt points out that ‘there is no
common law authority for expropriation in South African law.’27
Therefore, because expropriation is regarded as a unique state power, it
22 However, see Slade ‘Less invasive means: The relationship between
sections 25 and 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996’ in Hoops et al (eds) Rethinking Expropriation Law Vol I (2015) at 331-
348. On the general operation of the property clause in relation to the
seminal constitutional property law decision in First National Bank of SA Ltd
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another;
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA
768 (CC), see Van der Walt (2011) at 74-78. Even though the Court in First
National Bank held that all expropriations are deprivations and therefore all
limitations of property must comply with the requirements in terms of s
25(1) of the Constitution, the trend is to only have regard to the
requirements in s 25(2) of the Constitution in cases where a formal
expropriation has occurred. See in this regard, Du Toit v Minister of
Transport supra; Erf 16 Bryntirion v Minister of Public Works supra; Slade
(2015) at 340-341.
23 Van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) at 28.
24 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2013) 155; Van der Walt
(2012) at 28.
25 Supra n 23 at 156; Woolman & Botha ‘Limitations’ in Woolman et al (eds)
Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol II 2006 ch 34-7; S v Thebus 2003 6 SA
505 (CC) at parr 64-65.
26 See Van der Walt (2011) at 453; Van der Walt (2012) at 27. Gildenhuys
Onteieningsreg (2011) 93 states that law authorising expropriation, would
mostly be statutory law, although the author also provides an example of
expropriation in terms of the common law. 
27 Van der Walt (2011) at 453 with reference to Roux ‘Property’ in Cheadle et
al (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2010 ch 20. See
also Van der Walt (2012) at 27. To the contrary, see Gildenhuys (2011) at 93. 
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will always be carried out pursuant to legislation.28 This position is
supported by the provisions of the Expropriation Bill of 2015, since the
Bill requires the enabling legislation to specifically authorise a particular
authority to acquire property through expropriation before it can be
considered as such. Clause 2(3) of the Bill, which deals with the
application of the Bill, states as follows:
An expropriating authority may expropriate property in terms of a power
conferred on such expropriating authority by or under any law of general
application, provided that the exercise of those powers is in accordance with
sections 5 to 27 and 31.
Although this clause refers to ‘law of general application’, it is clear from
the Bill that the reference to ‘law’ is specifically restricted to legislation.
In clause 1 of the Bill, an ‘expropriating authority’ is defined as ‘an organ
of state or a person empowered by this Act or any other legislation to
acquire property through expropriation’.29 ‘Expropriation’, in turn, is
defined as the ‘compulsory acquisition of property’.30 
The requirement that an expropriating authority must be empowered
by legislation before it can expropriate property is a departure from the
position set out in both the 2008 and 2013 Expropriation Bills. In terms
of the 2008 Bill, an expropriating authority was an organ of state that was
empowered by the ‘Act or any other law’ to expropriate property.31 The
2013 Bill, on the other hand, referred to the relevant expropriating
authorities being empowered by ‘a law of general application’ to
expropriate property.32 Both the 2008 and 2013 Bill did not give greater
clarity as to what is considered ‘any other law’ or ‘a law of general
application’. The 2015 Bill is, therefore, more specific in that it requires
an expropriating authority to be empowered by legislation to expropriate
property. Therefore, on a plain reading of clause 2(3) and the definitions
identified above, an expropriating authority may only acquire property
through expropriation if that expropriating authority is specifically
empowered by legislation to expropriate property. 
28 Van der Walt (2011) at 453. See Joyce & McGregor v Cape Provincial
Administration 1946 AD 658 671, where the court stated that ‘all rights of
expropriation must rest upon a legislative foundation’. See further Jacobs &
Gildenhuys ‘Expropriation in South Africa’ in Erasmus (ed) Compensation
for Expropriation: A Comparative Study Vol I 1990 at 373; Gildenhuys (2001)
at 49.
29 Own emphasis
30 This is in line with the Constitutional Court decision in Agri SA v Minister for
Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) par 48 where the Court held that
‘expropriation entails state acquisition of the property’. See also Reflect-All
1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial
Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) par 64.
31 Ch 1 of the Expropriation Bill of 2008.
32 Ch 1 of the Expropriation Bill of 2013.
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Similar to the current Expropriation Act,33 the Expropriation Bill of
201534 awards the minister of public works the power to expropriate
property for a public purpose or in the public interest. The Expropriation
Bill does not affect the validity of other pieces of legislation (also future
legislation) that also confers expropriation powers. Therefore, other
pieces of legislation may be relied upon to expropriate property.
However, the other pieces of legislation must specifically authorise the
use of expropriation to achieve a public purpose. The Expropriation Bill
also dictates that all expropriations must comply with the procedural
requirements set out in clauses 5 to 27 and 31.35 
In light of the above, two important interrelated points become
apparent. Firstly, legislation must specifically authorise an expropriation.
The uncertainty about whether the common law can effect an
expropriation of property should therefore disappear. The notion that
legislation must specifically authorise an expropriation calls to question
certain decisions where the courts, especially the Constitutional Court,
have been prepared to award compensation for an expropriation even
though there was no formal expropriation procedure in terms of enabling
legislation. Secondly, regardless of the statute empowering an
expropriation, the procedure set out in the Bill must be followed in order
for an expropriation to be formally valid. In this regard, the Bill goes a
long way in ensuring that a uniform expropriation procedure will be
adopted by all expropriating authorities. The emphasis on statutory
authority and a mandatory expropriation procedure would restrict the
possibility of awarding compensation in cases where there is acquisition
of property, but not through expropriation. This also holds implications
for accepting the doctrine of constructive expropriation in South African
law, since constructive expropriation can only be recognised if the formal
authority to expropriate is not observed strictly.36 The implications of
these two interrelated points, as identified here, are further teased out
below. 
3 Legislation Must Specifically Authorise 
Expropriation: An Analysis of Case Law
The Expropriation Bill of 2015, which is set to replace the current
Expropriation Act of 1975, will be the primary and overarching piece of
legislation that will govern expropriation in South Africa. Similar to the
Expropriation Act, the Expropriation Bill empowers the minister of public
works to expropriate property. The Bill also recognises that expropriating
33 See s 2 of the Act.
34 Ch 2 of the Expropriation Bill of 2015.
35 Clauses 5 to 27 deal with processes involved in investigating the suitability
of the property to be expropriated, the manner and form of the notice of
intention to expropriate, the notice of expropriation, and issues
surrounding compensation. Clause 31 deals with transitional arrangements
and savings.
36 Van der Walt (2011) at 354.
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authorities other than the minister of public works may expropriate
property if those authorities are specifically empowered by other
legislation to expropriate property.37 Irrespective of whether property is
expropriated in terms of the Bill or other empowering legislation, the
procedure set out in the Bill must be applied. In this regard, the Bill
provides detailed guidelines as to how the expropriation process is to be
implemented by the relevant authority. The Bill also sets out how
compensation is to be calculated if property has been expropriated in
line with the requirements as set out in the Bill.
From the above, it is clear that only in cases where property is
acquired through expropriation can compensation be awarded in terms
of the Expropriation Bill. If property is acquired in terms of legislation
that does not authorise the use of expropriation to acquire the property,
and the expropriation process as set out in the Bill is not followed, the
acquisition of property cannot be treated as an expropriation, and the
compensation provisions in the Bill cannot apply. Therefore, an
interference with property in the form of an acquisition of property in
cases where there is no authority for the expropriation of such property
cannot be challenged in terms of the Expropriation Bill (or section 25(2)
of the Constitution).38
If legislation, therefore, causes the acquisition of property in the state,
but there is no authority for the expropriation in the legislation, the
acquisition cannot be regarded as an expropriation. Therefore, the
validity of such an acquisition cannot be challenged with reference to the
Expropriation Bill; it must be challenged in terms of the prohibition
against the arbitrary deprivation of property in section 25(1) of the
Constitution or in terms of the rules of administrative law.39 The
confiscation and forfeiture of property is an example where property is
acquired in terms of a regulatory framework and the validity of the
interference is tested against the requirements for a valid deprivation of
property in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.40 Therefore, in
cases where legislation of a regulatory nature causes property to vest in
the state, the validity would have to be considered in terms of section
25(1). In the absence of clear authority being granted to expropriate,
courts will be unable to award compensation in terms of the
Expropriation Bill.
37 This is made clear in the definition of ‘expropriation authority’ in ch 1 of
the Expropriation Bill. An expropriating authority may expropriate property
if empowered by ‘this Act or any other legislation’.
38 Since the Expropriation Bill gives effect to s 25(2), the principles of
subsidiarity dictates that the Expropriation Bill must be relied upon if an
expropriation is challenged. S 25(2) can only be relied upon if the Bill’s
constitutionality is challenged. On subsidiarity, specifically in the
constitutional property law context, see Van der Walt (2012) at 35-36.
39 See Van der Sijde Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and
Regulation: A Systemic Constitutional Approach (LLD thesis 2015 US), who
argues that a litigant can only rely on s 25(1) of the Constitution if the
deprivation was not caused by administrative action. 
40 See in this regard Van der Walt (2011) at 311-323.
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There are a few examples in case law where the courts have found that
an expropriation did not (or could not) occur, since the relevant state
department or minister did not have the necessary authority to
expropriate. For instance, in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v
Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others41 the high court held
that the threat of expropriation for which the applicant sought injunction
was not real, since the relevant authority did not have the power in terms
of the Expropriation Act of 1975 or the Eastern Cape Land Disposal Act42
to expropriate property. When the case came before the Constitutional
Court, the Court noted that without any formal expropriation procedure,
the validity of any future threat of expropriation would have to be
adjudicated in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.43 Similarly, the
minority of the Constitutional Court in Tshwane City v Link Africa44 held
that the provisions in the Expropriation Act could not apply to the matter
in question, since the legislation, namely section 22(1) of the Electronic
Communications Act,45 does not authorise the expropriation of property.
In this regard, the minority held that the impugned section authorised an
arbitrary deprivation of property in conflict with section 25(1) of the
Constitution. 
However, there are other examples where the Constitutional Court
specifically did not seriously consider the law of general application
requirement (i.e. the statutory authority to expropriate) and had held that
the compensation provisions in the Expropriation Act did apply. In these
cases, there was no authority in the applicable legislation to expropriate
property, but the Court nevertheless indicated that compensation may be
awarded in terms of the Expropriation Act. The first case in point is the
Constitutional Court’s decision in Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v
Cape Town City.46 
In Arun, the issue was whether the local authority was obliged to pay
compensation to the appellant since the local authority acquired the land
of the appellant through the operation of legislation.47 The appellant
relied on section 28 of the Land Use Planning Ordinance (LUPO)48 to
claim compensation for land that vested in the local authority. Section 28
of LUPO determines that ownership of any land that is required by the
local authority upon approval of subdivision for public streets and public
places based on the normal need arising from the subdivision, shall vest
in the local authority without compensation. The appellant argued that
since land in excess of those required for the ‘normal need’ also vested
41 2009 5 SA 661 (SE) 666-667.
42 7 of 2000.
43 Offit Enterprises v Coega Development Corporation supra (CC).
44 2015 6 SA 440 (CC) par 92.
45 36 of 2005 (as amended by the Electronic Communications Amendment
Act 37 of 2007 and the Electronic Communications Amendment Act 1 of
2014).
46 2015 2 SA 584 (CC).
47 Idem at 1.
48 15 of 1985.
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in the local authority upon approval of the subdivision, it had a right to
be compensated. The Constitutional Court awarded compensation on the
basis that section 28 of LUPO causes an ex lege transfer of ownership that
‘has the same effect as an expropriation’.49 The Court, therefore,
determined that the local authority is obliged to pay compensation in
terms of section 26(1) of the Expropriation Act of 1975.
In this decision, the Constitutional Court did not rigorously interrogate
the purpose of the law that caused the vesting of normal and excess land.
The purpose of LUPO is to regulate orderly township development; it
does not confer the power of expropriation to achieve any particular
purpose.50 Section 28 of LUPO allows for development contributions, a
regulatory measure that leads to acquisition of property without
compensation.51 The Court seems to have accepted that since property
that is in excess of the normal need vested in the local authority, the
owner is entitled to compensation as determined in terms of the
Expropriation Act since the section does not exclude compensation for
the excess property.52 
The provisions in the new Expropriation Bill as outlined above calls
into question the appropriateness of awarding compensation in Arun.53
In this decision, the particular legislative provision did not confer the
power of expropriation on the local authority in order to effect proper
town planning. The legislative provision allows for the vesting of property
in the local authority in cases where that property is required to provide
a particular development with public streets and places. The vesting of
property, in this case, is typically regarded as development contributions
or exactions, which falls under the state’s regulatory powers.54 The
validity of such exactions is therefore determined in terms of section
25(1), which requires a deprivation to be non-arbitrary.55 It has been
argued that the vesting of excess land was contrary to section 25(1),
because the Court itself admitted that there is no relationship between
the acquisition of the land in excess of the normal need and the purpose
of creating public streets and places for the development.56 The court
should, therefore, have determined the validity of the vesting of the
excess land in terms of section 25(1), and should not have ordered
compensation in terms of the Expropriation Act. In terms of section
49 Arun supra at par 73.
50 Slade ‘Compensation for what? An analysis of the outcome in Arun Property
Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City’ 2016 PER 1-25.
51 Slade 2016 PER 12-18; Van der Walt (2011) 290-292, Singer Introduction to
Property (2005) 736-737. On the interpretation of s 28 of LUPO, see also
Marais and Maree ‘At the intersection between expropriation law and
administrative law: Two critical views on the Constitutional Court’s Arun
judgment’ 2016 PER 1-54. 
52 However, it is questionable whether the section permits the vesting of land
in excess of the normal need. 
53 See also Slade 2016 PER 1-25.
54 Slade 2016 PER 1-25 at 12-15; Van der Walt (2011) 290-292.
55 Slade 2016 PER 1-25 at 12-15; Van der Walt (2011) 290-292.
56 Arun supra par 40. See also Slade 2016 PER 15.
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25(1), a court should declare an arbitrary deprivation unconstitutional.57
No provision is made for the payment of compensation in terms of
section 25(1).
The second case in which the Constitutional Court applied the
compensation provisions in the Expropriation Act without considering
whether there is actual authority in legislation that authorises
expropriation, is the majority decision in Link Africa. In Link Africa, the
Court considered the constitutional validity of section 22 of the Electronic
Communications Act.58 Section 22(1) of the Act permits a licence holder
to ‘enter upon any land’ for the purposes of constructing, maintaining,
altering or removing an electronic communications network. Section
22(2) requires that regard must be had to ‘applicable law’ when any
action is taken in terms of section 22(1). At issue was whether a licence
holder has to obtain consent from the relevant landowner before such
licence holder performs any of the actions in section 22(1) of the Act. The
argument of the respondent was that if consent is not required, any
action taken in terms of section 22 will be in conflict with section 25(1)
of the Constitution in that it permits an arbitrary deprivation of property. 
According to the majority, a licence holder can only perform the
actions identified in section 22(1) if the licence holder has regard to the
‘applicable law’ as required in terms of section 22(2). In terms of the
approach adopted by the majority, there are two sources of law that, if
applied, would prevent any action taken in terms of section 22(1) from
being considered arbitrary. The first is the law of servitudes. The Court
argued that section 22 affords the licence holder a public servitude,
which must be exercised with due regard to common law principles. In
this regard, the holder of the servitude (the licence holder) must exercise
the rights in terms of section 22(1) ‘respectfully and with due caution’.59
Therefore, the licence holder would have to consult with the owner of the
property before any action is taken in terms of section 22(1).60 Apart
from consulting with the owner regarding the exercise of the
competencies in terms of the licence, the court also held that the
common law requirement of compensation applies. With reference to
Van Rensburg v Coetzee61 the Court stated that in cases where a court
grants a way of necessity, the servitude that is created without the
landowner’s consent is ‘treated as a kind of expropriation’ that is
compensated.62 The compensation would be to counter the
disadvantage suffered by the affected property owner.63
57 See the discussion below on remedies.
58 36 of 2005 (as amended by the Electronic Communications Amendment
Act 37 of 2007 and the Electronic Communications Amendment Act 1 of
2014).
59 Link Africa supra at par 143. See Van der Walt Servitudes (2016) 207-208 on
the application of the law of servitudes in this decision.
60 Link Africa supra at par 154.
61 1979 4 SA 655 (AD).
62 Link Africa supra at par 149.
63 Idem at par 149.
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However, the Court also referred to a second source of law that, if
applied, prevents a finding of arbitrariness. The Court referred to section
3 of the Expropriation Act and held that ‘the public law protection of
compensation for expropriation by juristic persons other than the state
found in the Expropriation Act also applies to action taken under section
22(1).’64 The Court is not correct to apply section 3 of the Expropriation
Act, since the section allows the minister of public works to expropriate
property on request of a juristic person if that juristic person requires the
property for a public purpose but is unable to acquire it on reasonable
terms.65 In this decision there was no request made to the minister to
expropriate property for public purposes. In Link Africa, the legislation
allowed the licence holder to enter upon the property of another for
purposes of carrying out various tasks related to the construction and
maintenance of the telecommunication networks. While the minister of
public works may be called upon to expropriate property in order to
allow a third party to fulfil a public purpose, the relevant section of the
Electronic Telecommunications Act that was challenged does not
authorise the use of expropriation in any form to realise the purpose of
construction and maintenance of telecommunication networks. In the
event that legislation does not authorise expropriation to achieve a
particular public purpose, the compensation provisions of the
Expropriation Act should not apply. The minority’s view that the
Expropriation Act does not apply is in this regard the correct approach,
and is supported by the provisions in the Expropriation Bill. The
compensation provisions in the Expropriation Bill would not apply in
cases where there is no specific authority to expropriate property and
where the expropriation procedure in the Bill has not been followed.
The two decisions discussed above shows an emerging tendency on
the part of the Constitutional Court to apply the compensation provisions
in the Expropriation Act in cases where there is no authority in the
legislation to expropriate property. In both Arun and Link Africa the
legislation in question is regulatory in nature. The aim of LUPO is to
‘regulate land use planning and to provide for matters incidental
thereto.’66 Similarly, the primary purpose of the Electronic
Communications Act67 is to ‘provide for the regulation of electronic
communications in the Republic in the public interest’.68 In terms of the
provisions in the Expropriation Bill, as discussed above, the courts will be
unable to award compensation in cases where there is no authority in the
legislation in question to expropriate. If there is no authority in legislation
to compulsorily acquire property through expropriation, any acquisition
of property that is caused by or permitted in legislation cannot be
attacked by relying on the Expropriation Bill or section 25(2) of the
64 Idem at par 157.
65 See further Van der Walt ‘Constitutional property law’ 2016 ASSAL
(forthcoming).
66 Long title of the Ordinance. 
67 36 of 2005.
68 S 2 of the Act.
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Constitution. If legislation, therefore, causes or permits the acquisition of
property, but there is no authority to expropriate, the infringement of
property should be attacked with reference to section 25(1). This would
mean that compensation with reference to the Expropriation Bill cannot
be awarded for the compulsory acquisition of property in cases where an
expropriation is not specifically authorised by legislation. 
4 Implications for the Recognition of 
Constructive Expropriation
As argued above, the Bill makes it clear that expropriation can only take
place if an expropriating authority is specifically empowered in
legislation to acquire property through expropriation. Furthermore, the
Bill makes the expropriation procedure, as set out in the Bill, mandatory,
irrespective of the legislation relied upon to expropriate property. The
Expropriation Bill sets out three phases in the expropriation procedure.69
The first phase relates to the investigation and gathering of information
as to the suitability of the property to be expropriated.70 The second
phase relates to serving notice of expropriation on the owner of the
property or the holder of an unregistered right in the property.71 The
third phase relates to the notice of expropriation that must be served on
the owner or holder of an unregistered right if the expropriating authority
decides to expropriate the property.72 In the notice of expropriation, the
expropriating authority must include the amount of compensation that is
payable.73 Chapter 5 (clauses 12-20), deals with compensation for
expropriation. Clause 12 of the bill sets out how compensation must be
determined. Clause 12(1), which is similar to section 25(3) of the
Constitution, states that ‘[t]he amount of compensation to be paid to an
expropriated owner or expropriated holder must be just and equitable
reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the
interests of the expropriated owner or expropriated holder.’ The
compensation provision in chapter 5 of the Bill would arguably only
apply in cases where property has been expropriated, in other words in
cases where legislation has been relied upon to expropriate property and
if the expropriation procedure in the Bill has been adhered to. This may
hold implications for the acceptance of the doctrine of constructive
expropriation in South African law. 
The acceptance of the doctrine of constructive expropriation has not
been decided authoritatively in South African law.74 In Steinberg v South
69 Supra n 10 at 21-35.
70 Ch 3 of Bill. See supra n 10 at 31-32.
71 Clause 7 of the Bill. See supra n 10 at 32-33.
72 Clause 8 of the Bill. See supra n 10 at 33-34.
73 Clause 8(3)(g) states that the amount of compensation is either ‘the amount
of compensation offered by the expropriating authority or agreed to by the
expropriating authority and the owner and the holder of an unregistered
right’.
74 Van der Walt (2011) 376.
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Peninsula Municipality75 the Supreme Court of Appeal raised the
possibility of accepting constructive expropriation, but in the end it gave
no definite answer as to whether it should be accepted.76 Constructive
expropriation seems to operate in a so-called ‘grey area’ between
deprivations in section 25(1) and expropriations in section 25(2) of the
Constitution.77 The doctrine of constructive expropriation would
therefore only be recognised if the concepts deprivation and
expropriation cannot be clearly distinguished from each other.78 
Mostert argues that the ‘“doctrine” of constructive expropriation
should essentially serve to curb excessive exercise of the state’s
regulatory powers for the sake of the public interest.’79 She argues that
upon invoking the doctrine of constructive expropriation, a claimant
would either be seeking enforcement of the compensation provision in
section 25(2) or alternatively the invalidation of the excessive regulation
in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.80 Constructive
expropriation can, therefore, occur when a court transforms an excessive
regulatory measure into an expropriation, thereby triggering the
compensation provision in section 25(2) of the Constitution.81 It is
argued that constructive expropriation can only be recognised in
jurisdictions where either the formal authority for expropriation or state
acquisition of property is not strongly emphasised.82 With regard to state
acquisition, the Constitutional Court has held that ‘[t]here can be no
expropriation in circumstances where deprivation does not result in
property being acquired by the state’.83 It would, therefore, seem as if
state acquisition of property is required before a deprivation can be
considered an expropriation that must be compensated. However, it
would be incorrect to treat any infringement on property that also
involves state acquisition of the property concerned as an expropriation.
There are various examples where state acquisition of property by the
state in terms a regulatory scheme is not treated as expropriation, but
75 2001 4 SA 1243 (SCA).
76 On Steinberg supra and constructive expropriation see Van der Walt (2011)
377-381; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert (2006) 554-557.
77 Van der Walt (2011) 347.
78 Mostert ‘The distinction between deprivations and expropriations and the
future of the ‘doctrine’ of constructive expropriation in South African law’
2003 SAJHR 573 describes this particular reading as a ‘disjunctive’ reading
of s 25(1) and (2). 
79 Mostert 2003 SAJHR 569.
80 Idem at 569.
81 See Mostert 2003 SAJHR 569; Bezuidenhout Compensation for Excessive but
otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action (LLD thesis 2014 US) 57-58; Van
der Walt (2011) 350; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert (2006) 553-554
82 Van der Walt (2011) 354; supra n 32 at 58. German law, for instance, require
that a law must specifically authorise an expropriation and indicate the
basis upon which compensation must be calculated. Therefore,
constructive expropriation is not recognised in German law: See Van der
Walt (2011) 366; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 146-
150. 
83 Agri SA supra at par 59.
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whose legitimacy is determined with reference to section 25(1) of the
Constitution.84 
Although expropriation involves state acquisition of property, the Bill
makes it clear that there should also be express authority for that
acquisition in the form of expropriation in the enabling legislation.
Therefore, the Bill’s emphasis on the statutory authority for an
expropriation, as well as making the expropriation procedure set out in
the Bill mandatory, may hold implications for the recognition of
constructive expropriation in South African law. If it is accepted that
constructive expropriation involves payment of compensation in cases
where a regulatory measure imposes a severe burden on a particular
property owner, the provisions in the Bill potentially makes the
recognition of constructive expropriation impossible. In terms of the Bill,
an expropriation that requires compensation would only come about
when there is specific legislative authority for an expropriation in the
legislation and where the expropriation procedure in the Bill has been
followed. In cases where there is no legislative authority to expropriate
property for a particular purpose, questions of expropriation and
compensation do not surface. 
Therefore, if regulatory legislation causes property to vest in the state
and it is regarded as excessive by a court, the court should, as a first
option, invalidate the acquisition or the legislation that causes the
acquisition. The court would not be able to award compensation in terms
of the Expropriation Bill or section 25(2) of the Constitution because the
provisions in the Bill does not allow for that. If, however, the purpose of
the law or the acquisition is important, and invalidation of the law would
not be the best option,85 the court would have to develop another
remedy that may involve some form of payment. This remedy can
include the payment of equalisation payments,86 reading-in a
compensation provision into the legislation that causes the
deprivation,87 or awarding constitutional damages in terms of sections
38 and 172(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution.88 Although the discussion
about the appropriateness of alternative remedies is outside the scope of
this article, it seems clear that the courts would not be able to award
compensation for an expropriation of property in cases where the
legislation does not specifically authorise the expropriation and where
the expropriation procedure in the Bill has not been implemented. The
incorporation of the doctrine of constructive expropriation into South
African law, therefore, seems unlikely.
84 See the discussion above at 3. See further Van der Walt (2011) 290; 311-312.
85 Supra n 32 at 42-52.
86 Supra n 32 at 129-209, Van der Walt (2011) 345-346, 367, Badenhorst,
Pienaar & Mostert (2006) 557-558.
87 Supra n 32 at 239-250, 283.
88 Supra n 32 at 250-280, 285-296.
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5 Conclusion
In this article, the law of general application requirement in section 25(2)
of the Constitution has been considered in light of the applicable
provisions in the new Expropriation Bill of 2015. It is argued that the law
of general application requirement in section 25(2) is restricted to
legislation. The Bill makes it clear, in clause 2(3) and the accompanying
definitions in clause 1, that property may only be acquired through
expropriation if legislation specifically authorises the use of expropriation
to achieve a particular public purpose. In this regard, there is no common
law authority of expropriation. Furthermore, the expropriation
procedure as set out in the Bill must be followed by all authorities that are
granted expropriatory powers in terms of either the Expropriation Bill or
other enabling legislation. 
The effect of strictly requiring a legislative basis to expropriate
property coupled with the mandatory expropriation procedure that must
be followed would potentially restrict the courts’ ability to award
compensation for an apparent expropriation in property disputes. Courts
would not be able to award compensation for the acquisition of property
in cases where there was no legislation authorising expropriation and
where the expropriation procedure as set out in the Bill has not been
followed. This conclusion calls to question the Constitutional Court’s
decision in Arun, where the Court awarded compensation for an
apparent expropriation, even though the legislation in question did not
provide for expropriation and even though no expropriation procedure
was adopted. If the Court was correct in treating the issue as a
constitutional property issue, then the Court should have decided the
case with reference to section 25(1). The Court seems to accept that since
acquisition of property occurred, compensation must also follow.
However, this view cannot be supported as it blurs the line between valid
regulatory state interference with property that may involve acquisition
of such property and expropriation. As indicated above, there are
instances where valid regulatory state interference with property leads to
the acquisition of property, but it is not treated as an expropriation, since
expropriation is a unique state power only to be used in clearly
circumscribed circumstances, and generally as a matter of last resort.
Strictly requiring a legislative basis for an expropriation also renders
the acceptance of the doctrine of constructive expropriation unlikely in
South African law. In terms of the doctrine of constructive expropriation,
courts transform an excessive regulatory imposition of property into an
expropriation that must be compensated, since invalidation of the
regulation would not be expedient. However, if a legislative basis
authorising expropriation is strictly required, courts will not be able to
award compensation in terms of the Expropriation Bill or section 25(2)
in cases where it is found that a necessary regulatory measure is
excessive, since courts will not be able to decide whether an
expropriation has taken place or not. 
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The Expropriation Bill of 2015, which is set to replace the pre-
democratic Expropriation Act of 1975 goes a long way in complying with
the constitutional requirements for an expropriation, especially those
found in section 25(2) of the Constitution. Although certain aspects of the
Bill are called into question,89 the Bill does provide greater clarity as to
what is to be understood as ‘law of general application’. Requiring
expropriation to be expressly authorised by legislation should be
welcomed as it potentially provides greater clarity as to when a particular
dispute must be resolved with reference to expropriation law. 
89 Supra n 10 at 21-35.
